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Abstract
This paper illustrates the static labor supply model using a large cross sectional
data set encompassing the countries of Great Britain. I focus on estimating
the labor force participation decision what is referred in the literature as labor
supply on the extensive margin. The sensitivity along the extensive margin is
expressed by calculating two specifications of a participation elasticity, defined
as the percentage change in the labor force participation rate induced by a one
percentage change in the gross wage or the net effective wage. The elasticities of
labor supply are computed separately for men and women. The basic problem
in estimating labor supply models with non-workers is unobservability of their
wage rates that makes a non-random nature of the sample. I follow Heckman
(1979) approach to correct for sample selection bias by estimating wage equation
for workers and non-workers. Predicted wage rates along with non-wage incomes
and a range of household characteristics are used in the probit regression model
while the standard errors of the predicted wage rates were bootstrapped to
correct for error-prone sampling distribution of predicted wage regressors that
are non-linear functions of the estimated model parameters. I find that semi-
elasticities of labor supply on the extensive margin with respect to gross wage
are 0.09 and -0.03 percentage points for men and women, respectively. Using the
net effective wage rate these elasticities are 0.10 and -0.01 for men and women,
respectively. Both estimated elasticities are marginally larger in the net effective
wage specification which I interpreted as a marginal incentive for men to join
the labor market and less disincentive effect for women to withdraw from the
labor market.
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1 Introduction
The literature on labor supply occupied for several decades a crutial theoretical
and empirical role in economic research. The main reason for a great concern
for this topic has to do with knowing the responses of labor supply to after
tax wages and transfers in order to construct the e¤ective welfare system. As
Keane (2011) pointed out, it is logical that much the labor supply literature
concerns on how income taxes a¤ects peoplesincentives about working hours.
However, the literature on labor supply is characterized by very distinct conclu-
sions about the size of labor supply elasticities and methodological procedures
that were used. Most studies have found small labor supply elasticities for men
but large labor supply elasticities for women, with respect to after tax wage
rates. Kosters (1969) was the rst to estimate labor supply function for em-
ployed married men, obtaining a negative Marshallian elasticities on wage and
non-labor income but many problems in estimation were ignored. Ashenfelter
and Heckman (1973) followed by Masters and Gartnkel (1977) estimated small
and negative Marshallian elasticities for married men accounting for the mea-
surement error that arrises from endogeneity in wage or non-labor income. The
British studies of male labor supply begin with Brown, Levin and Ulph (1976)
who estimated wage elasticty of hour of work of between -0.085 and -0.131 at
sample mean values. Using picewise linear budget constraint to nd the optimal
number of working hours, Ashworth and Ulph (1981) computed negative wage
elasticity of hours of work of between -0.07 and -0.13. Layard (1978) estimates
uncompensated wage elasticity of -0.13 using a sample of married men.
The literature on labor supply for women focused on modeling the partici-
pation due to the large extent of non-participation among women1 . For women,
uncompensated elasticity of hours of work with respect to wage is estimated
by Dooley (1982), Nakamura and Nakamura (1981), and Nakamura, Nakamura
and Cullen (1979). In all these studies they calculated labor supply elasticity
with respect to wage of -0.30 or less. Dooley (1982) and Heckman (1980) com-
puted labor supply elasticity with respect to wage in excess of 14.00. Smith and
Stelcner (1985) calculated small and positive labor supply elastity with respect
to wage. The reason for large variation in uncompensated wage elasticity for
women is because the procedures employed in these studies di¤er substantially.
Important contribution to female labor supply elasticity comes fromMroz (1987)
who conducted sensitivity analyses and obtained wage elasticity from -0.02 to
0.09. The impact of tax reforms on labor supply were to be of a great concern for
empirical applications. Eissa and Liebman (1996) estimated the e¤ects of Tay
Reform Act and Earned Income Tax Credit on labor supply for single women
and then they compared the change in labor supply for women with children
to the change in labor suppyl for women without children. The results showed
an increase in the participation of women with children by 1.9-2.8 percentage
points relative to women without children. Blundell et al. (1998) focused on tax
reforms in the UK over the 1980s and early 1990s to nd labor supply e¤ects of
1For modeling the participation decision, see Heckman (1974).
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married women from a series of repeated cross-sections. They computed small
and positive unompensated labor supply elasticities while the income elastici-
ties were negative, except for those women without children. Eissa et al. (2004)
studied the labor supply and welfare e¤ects for single mothers in the US follow-
ing for tax acts, incorporating both the intensive and the extensive margin of
labor supply. Their ndings were that the welfare gains are generated by the
participation responses of single mothers.
Numerous tax and benets reforms, like the Family Credit system or the
Working Families Tax Credit in the UK and the Earned Income Tax Credit on
the US, are created in order to induce a greater labor force participation rates.
However, sometimes increasing the generocity of benet systems might produce
unintendent e¤ects of making employment relatively less attractive that in the
rst time before this change. Dilnot and Duncan (1992) created negative em-
ployment responses that were incentivized by the UKs Family Credit system.
Thus, modelling labor supply responces to changes in tax-benet systems are
necessary for understanding the welfare e¤ects of these changes. Specifying the
functional form for capturing labor supply e¤ects in behavioural microsimula-
tion occupies an important place in empirical work. In continuous estimation
approach it is favoured to derive the direct or inderect utility function from the
maximization problem, see Arrufat and Zabalaza (1986) and Hausman (1981).
Another option that is the most suitable for estimating discrete models is to
assume a form of direct utility function.
Some of modelling di¢ culties for empirical work of labor supply includes
the enodgeneity and heterogeneity problems, inclusion of stochastic elements
in microsimulation and dealing with nonlinear nature of tax-benet systems.
These di¢ culties are tempted to resolve by using continuous or discrete ap-
proach in estimation. In order to deal with di¢ culties of the tax schedule, Hall
(1973) linearized the budget constraint around observed working hours. How-
ever, Burtless and Hausman (1978) showed that presece of measurement error
in the level of hours implies biased estimation of parameters in the model. They
developed a descripton of the budget constraint that serves as an alternative to
constructing the marginal tax rate. The following model is then estimated in
work by Arrufat and Zabalaza (1986), Hausman (1981, 1986) where the optimal
number of working hours is determined by comparing the utility dened over
each linear segment of the budget constraint with the utility obtaied when not
working. Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1992) estimate a labor supply model
while including a selection correction term to correct for selection bias. Esti-
mation of the labor supply responses of married women while correcting for
selection bias is done by Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998). There exists
a numerous studies that estimated labor supply models incorporating discrete
budget set, see for example Blundell, Duncan , McCrae and Meghir (1999),
Callan and Van Soest (1996), Keane and Mo¢ tt (1988), Van Soest (1995).
Another problem that arrises in estimation of a labor suppy models is con-
cerned with the unobservability of wage rates for non-working individuals. The
solution has been found in estimating the expected market wages that can be
used in place of missing data for non-working individuals. Heckman (1979) de-
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veloped a method that estimates conditional expectation on wage rates control-
ling for sample selection. Modelling non-participation is often very important
issue when assessing the e¤ects of tax and benets reforms on labor supply. Very
often studies that deal with the impact of taxes and benets on labor supply are
assuming that reservation wages exceed the market wages for participants. Mroz
(1987) pointed out, that simply assuming corner solution for non-participants
creates an econometric problems in estimation. Another aspect in estimation
that a¤ects the likelihood that a pontential worker becomes employed and can
be controlled for are xed costs of employment, see for example Blundell, Ham
and Meghir (1987) and Cogan (1981).
There is the distinction between decision whether to work at all and how
much working hours to supply at the individual level. The former is re¤ered
as the extensive margin of labor supply, calculated as the number of individ-
uals that were employed and the latter is re¤ered as the intensive margin of
labor supply, calculated as thr number of hours worked. In microeconometric
studies the size of wage elasticities at these two margins showed di¤erent results
with respect to some demographic characteristics (Blundell & Macurdy (1999)).
Empirical evidence conrms that the elasticity at the extensive margin is larger
than the elasticity at the intensive margin, which means that individuals tend
to react more sensitively at participation decision than on the supply of average
working hours. However, this does not imply that the decisons on the extensive
margin accounts for a larger welfare gains. Blau and Kahn (2007) argues that
the labor supply elasticities of men and women equated recently due to incresed
labor force participation of women. The distinction between the extensive and
intensive margins is based on the time span for which these changes are ac-
counted for. For example, numerous microeconometric studies concentrated on
weekly hours of work what is in contrast with some other studies that are using
annual hours of work.
This thesis estimates labor supply responses in Great Britain, using the gen-
eral household survey for the year 2005. I follow Heckman (1979) to estimate
a wage equation controlling for the selection bias into employment. After pre-
dicting the wages for everybody in the sample I estimate the wage labor supply
elasticity at the extensive margin using the gross wage and the net e¤ective
wage, which is constructed by taking into accout paid taxes and received bene-
ts. The di¤erence between the two wage specications designates the e¤ect of
tax-benet system on the labor supply which intuitively characterises the welfare
system. The e¤ects of demographic variables on the labor force participation
are presented subequently. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework of
static labor supply. Section 3 presents the econometric framework of Hackman
sample selection model and the participation decision model. Section 4 presents
a detail description of dataset used in estimation. Section 5 presents results on
elasticities at extensive margin and e¤ects of demographic variables on labor
frce participation. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The static model of labor supply
The basic setup for a static labor supply problem consists of an individual or a
household containing a single worker faced with the choice of the optimal amount
of time an individual would like to work and the choice of choosing the optimal
amount of consumption bundles. The direct approach to nding the agents
labor supply function is to maximize strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave
utility function subject to given constraints. The indirect utility function can
be expressed as:
V (p; w; y) = max
c;h
U(c;H   h) (1)
The utility maximization problem is subject to the following constraints:
c  wh  T (wh; y; Z) + y; (2)
H  H   h  0; (3)
c  0 (4)
where U () is a well dened utility function which is strictly increasing in con-
sumption c and leisure l = H   h; that is comparable to other goods. Hours
of work are denoted by h; the agent has non-labor income and other household
income denoted by y. Beside that, the agent is endowed with labor income
wh; where productivity or hourly wage rate is denoted by w. The tax sys-
tem is dened as the amount of paid taxes minus received transfers to public
sector and it is described by a function T (wh; y; Z). Net payment to public
sector, T (wh; y; Z); depends on the level of individuals labor and other house-
hold income and demographic characteristics of the household Z. The second
constraint means that a negative amount of working time cannot be supplied
and that labor supply is not feasible above the time endowment H. In addition,
a negative amount of goods cannot be consumed. For simplicity, I assume that
there is only a single consumtion good, where the price of consumption good is
taken as the numeraire.
One can divide and solve the following problem in two phases. First phase is
to solve for the optimal hours of work controlling for the employment decision
and in the second phase the agentsare choosing whether to participate or not
in the market at the optimal working hours. Solving for the rst phase by
setting up the Lagrangean and assuming that an interior optimum with respect
to consumption decision and hours of work holds2 :
L(c; h; ; p; w; y; T ) = max
c;h
U(c;H   h) + (wh  T (wh; y; Z) + y   c) (5)
2 In other words, this assumption implies that the last two constraints are non-binding.
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The rst order conditions at the interior optimum after equating them with
zero are:
Lc =
@U(c;H   h)
@c
   = 0 (6)
Lh =  @U(c;H   h)
@h
  

w   @T (wh; y; Z)
@(wh)
w

= 0 (7)
L = wh  T (wh; y; Z) + y   c = 0 (8)
The rst two conditions can be rewritten as:
 @U(c;H   h)
@h
= (1   i)w@U(c;H   h)
@c
(9)
where  i = @T (wh; y; Z)=@(wh) is the marginal tax rate of working an additional
hour which includes the marginal tax rate and the reduction in transfers due to
increased the individuals earnings. The solution to the maximization problem
above is represented by the Marshallian demand functions:
c0 = c(p; w; y; Z) > 0 (10)
h0 = h(p; w; y; Z) > 0 (11)
l0 = H   h0 = l(p; w; y; Z) < H (12)
0 = (p; w; y; Z) (13)
In the second phase, the solution is found for the participation decision. If
the utility from participation is greater then the utility that is obtained when
non-participating, U(c0; h0)  U(c0; 0); an individual decides to enter the la-
bor market. For those individuals who are not participating in the market, the
optimal consumption c0 contains the transfers from public sector for unemploy-
ment, non-labor income and other household income, c0 =  T (0; y; Z) + y: For
individuals that participate in the labor market, they have optimal consumption
c0 that is sum of individuals labor income, non-labor income, other household
income minus net payments from the public sector:
c0 = wh0   T (wh0; y; Z) + y (14)
= wh0   T (wh0; y; Z) + c0 + T (0; y; Z)
= c0 + wh
0

1  T (wh
0; y; Z)  T (0; y; Z)
wh0

= c0 + (1  )wh0
where  =

T (wh0; y; Z)  T (0; y; Z) =wh0, denotes the e¤ective marginal tax
rate on the labor force participation. The solution for the optimal number of
hours of work h0 is the following:
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h0 =

h0 if U(c0; h0)  U(c0; 0)
0 if U(c0; h0) < U(c0; 0):
(15)
The labor supply decision of an individual is represented in two separatate
choices. The rst choice for an individual is to choose whether or not to par-
ticipate in the market, that is the labor supply at the extensive margin. The
second choice is to choose the optimal number of hours of work conditional on
the participation, what is denoted as the decision on the intensive margin. In
estimating the labor force participation behavior I am following the extensive
margin approach. Rationale behind that, among the others, is implied in the
nature of labor contracts that are not exible enough to allow workers to choose
desired number of hours of work. Moreover, for di¤erent occupations where the
workers choose wage levels and hours of work, simultaneous estimation of labor
supply is needed.
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3 The econometric model specication
In this section I illustrate the econometric theoretical framework to analyze labor
supply at the extensive margin when unobserved characteristics inuence the
level of the market wage to non-working individuals in the sample. This presents
a problem in estimating behavioral labor supply responses since the wage rate for
non-workers is not observed. I begin with the specication of the Heckit model
that enables to factor unobserved characteristics by estimating the expected
market wage for the non-working individuals. Then, I describe the participation
probit model which is employed as the basic econometric framework for the
empirical analysis of labor supply.
3.1 Heckman sample selection model
The OLS estimation in selected samples leads to inconsistent parameter estima-
tion even if population conditional mean is linear in right hand side variables.
To obtain consistent estimation of the parameters of interest, alternative esti-
mation techniques that rely on stronger distributional assumptions are therefore
necessary. Here I present the Heckman (1979) bivariate sample selection model
that is used in the rst part of the estimation. The bivariate sample selection
model generalizes the Tobit (1958) model with the specication of a censored
latent variable that is used as the indicator for the another latent variable that
determines the outcome of interest3 . It is important to notice that a selected
sample is a synonym for a nonrandom sample that results either from sample
design or from nonresponsive behavior of respondents on questions in the survey.
The Heckman model introduces a latent variable y1 and the outcome latent
variable y2 . In the labor supply terminology, y

1 denotes the unobserved propen-
sity to work and y2 denotes the supply of working hours. The problematic part
of the labour supply estimation lies in the fact that a main determinant, wage, is
not observed for non-working individuals. If people make their decisions about
employment randomly, we could then ignore the fact that not all wages are
observed and OLS estimation remains appropriate technique for estimating the
participation decisions. Nonetheless, it does not seem plausible to belive that
people randomly decide about the supply of their working hours. Individuals
who would have high wages may decide to the participate in paid labor market
with higher probability than the others with lower wages. Therefore, the esti-
mated parameter on wage is upwardly biased when it is estimated without taking
into account a sample selection e¤ect. One of the approach to tackle this prob-
lem is given by Mroz (1987), who introduces a wage equation and substitutes it
for rst latent variable equation. Then one can nd the variable a¤ecting the
selection to work but not the wage o¤er equation. The participation equation
can be dened as:
3Amemiya (1985) termed this model as the Tobit type II, while Wooldridge (2002) called
it a probit selection equation.
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y1 =

1 if y1 > 0
0 if y1  0
(16)
The outcome equation is given by the following expression:
y2 =

y2 if y

1 > 0
 if y1  0
(17)
What follows from the two equations system is that whenever y1 is positive
then y2 will be known, whereas for non positive y1 we can not observe y2. One
misleading approach that can lead to inappropriate use of the Heckman model
will be to set y1 to zero when y2 = 0. However, there is no justication to set the
o¤ered wage rate to zero just becuase it is not observed. Further, the Heckman
sample selection model assumes the linearity in regressors and additive error
terms of the two equations system:
y1 = X
0
11+1
y2 = X
0
22+2
(18)
where X1and X2 denotes the vectors of variables for a system of equations. Dis-
tributional assumptions of the error terms in a system of equations are dened
as the following:
1jX  N [0; 1] (19)
2jX  N

0; 22

(20)
Cov [1; 2jX] = 12 (21)
where X is dened as a vector containing X1 and X2; X = (X1;X2)
0. Given
the assumption of bivariate normal error terms where the variance of 1 is
normalized to 1 without loss of generality because y1 is a bivariate variable and
given the assumption of homoscedasticity of error terms4 , the estimation can
be performed by using maximum likelihood estimation. The probability that
we observe y2 is then given by the probability that y

1 > 0 multiplied by the
conditional probability of y2 conditional on y

1 > 0: Therefore the density of
the known values of y2 is f (y

2 jy1 > 0) Pr [y1 > 0] : For non positive values of
y1 , one do not observe any values of y

2 and the density is the probability of y

1
being non positive, Pr [y1  0]. The likelihood function for the bivariate sample
selection model is then dened as:
L=
nY
i=1
fPr [y1> 0]g1 y1i ff (y2 jy1 > 0) Pr [y1 > 0]gy1i (22)
The log-likelihood function is derived by simply taking the logarithm of the
likelihood function:
4 In other words this implies strict exogeneity of error terms.
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logL=
nX
i=1
(1  y1i) log fPr [y1 > 0]g+y1i log ff (y2 jy1 > 0) Pr [y1 > 0]g (23)
As we can see from the last two equations, the log-likelihood function is having
a degenerate distribution, that is a compostition of discrete distribution when
y1  0 and the continuous distribution when y1 > 0: The population conditional
distribution in truncated samples is considered to be normal, where mostly
truncated normal of truncated Tobit regressions have been used in estimation.
Calculating the conditional mean in the sample selection model will di¤er
from OLS conditional mean which implies the inconsistent parameter estimation
of the latter method. For randomly obtained sample from the population and
assuming a linearity in conditional expectation of yi on Xi, E[yijXi] = X0i,
the estimation suggests using OLS approach. However, when the selection in
the sample is based on y1 , the OLS parameter estimation might su¤er from
inconsistency. The conditional mean of y2 in the sample selectivity model where
one uses only a positive values of y1; is then dened as:
E [y2jX;y1 > 0] = E [X02+2jX011+1 > 0] (24)
= E [X021j1 >  X011] + E [2j1 >  X011]
= X022 + E [2j1 >  X011]
whereX = (X1;X2)
0. Following the assumption of correlation of the error terms
1and 2, the last term on the right hand side of the conditional mean cannot be
zero and therefore a sample selection needs to be taken into consideration. Given
the normality assumption of error terms, Heckman proposed the correlation
between the two terms in the following way:
2 = 121 +  (25)
where  denotes the random variable, independent of 1
5 :The truncated mean
of y2 when using the previous assumption can be rewritten as:
E [y2jX;y1 > 0] = X022 + E [(121 + ) j1 >  X011] (26)
= X022 + 12E [1j1 >  X011] + E [j1 >  X011]
= X022 + 12E [1j1 >  X011]
5Note that the covariance between erorr terms 1and 2, 12; can be expressed as 12 =
2, where  denotes the correlation coe¢ cient between error terms 1and 2. Following this
notation one can rewritte the truncated conditional mean as:
E [y2jX;y1 > 0] = X022 + E

(21 + ) j1 >  X011

= X022 + 21E

1
1
j 1
1
>
 X011
1

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Using the left-truncated moments of the standard normal distribution, the ex-
pectation term of 1 on the right hand side of the truncated mean of y2 is given
by:
E [1j1 >  X011] = 1E

1
1
j 1
1
>
 X011
1

(27)
= 1
1Z
 X011=1
z[(z)=1  ( X011=1)]dz
= 1
 ( X011=1)
[1  ( X011=1)]
= 1
(X011=1)
(X011=1)
= 1 (X
0
11=1)
where the third line in the expression above uses symmetry about zero of the
standard normal density  () and  () denotes the standard normal cdf6 . The
ratio of the standard normal density  () and the standard normal cdf  (), is
called the inverse Mills ratio and it is denoted by  () : Combining the condi-
tional expectation of error term 1, with the truncated mean of y2, the condi-
tional expectation of positive observed variable y2 can be rewritten as:
E [y2jX;y1 > 0] = X022 + 121

X011
1

(28)
The conditional left-truncated expectation of y2 implies that standard OLS esti-
mation in the case of sample selection bias will produce inconsistent estimation
of parameters of interest unless the covariance term between two errors 1and
2 is zero. The Heckmans two step approach, estimaties the omitted regres-
sor  (X011=1) using OLS regression estimation. As the name indicates, the
Heckmans sample selection estimation can be described in two steps. First step
is to use probit regression of y1 on X1, where the probability that the variable
y1 is positive is given by
7 :
Pr [y1 > 0] = Pr [X
0
11+1 > 0] (29)
= Pr

1
1
j 1
1
>
 X011
1

= 1  
 X011
1

= 

X011
1

6The standard normal cdf,  (), gives the probability of truncation when truncation is at
point .
7Here I used the symmetry of the standard normal distribution about zero.
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The inverse Mills ratio8 , (X011=1) ,can then be estimated from the rst step
probit regression. The second step in estimation consists of the OLS estimation
of y2 on X2 and 

X01^1=^1

for positive values of y2:
y2i = X
0
2i2 + 121
 
X01^1
^1
!
+ i (30)
where i is OLS error term
9 . Heckman (1979) showed that we can consistently
estimate 2 and  by using the selected sample in OLS regression of y2 onX2 and


X01^1=^1

, where 1can be consistently estimated from the probit model
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on the selection equation. The Heckman model can also be estimated by MLE.
MLE requires that 1 and 2 are distributed bivariate normal with mean zero
and correlation term , that is 1; 2  N [0; 0; 1; 22; ]. Therefore,:Therefore,
the MLE estimation is not as general as the two step procedure. MLE is less
robust and than the two step procedure and it is sometimes di¤cult to get
it converge.However, the Heckit estimator can su¤er from a loss in e¢ ciency
compared to the MLE if 1and 2are jointly normally distributed. Nontheless,
the Heckit11 estimator is very simple to implement, it requires distributional
assumptions12 weaker than joint normality of 1 and 2 and these distributional
assumptions can be weakened even further to permit semiparametric estimation.
3.2 The participation decision model
The participation decision is referred as a choice between working or not work-
ing. Here I illustrate the probit regression model which is the main build-
ing block for the empirical analysis. A dichotomous variable INLFi indicates
whether an individual i supplies positive or zero number of working hours. In
the former case INLFi equals one and zero otherwise. The analysis of labor
supply in the neoclassical model assumes that the participation decision is a
function of the net e¤ective wage (1   i)wi13 , a vector of household character-
istics Zi and other demographic variables that inuence individual preferences,
non-labor income of an individuals and other household income yi and the cost
8The estimated inverse Mills is dened as follows: 

X01^1
^1

=
(X01^1=^1)
(X01^1=^1)
:
9Both the OLS standard errors and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors from second
step estimation equation are not correct because the trunacated variance of y2 is heteroscedas-
tic, unless 12 = 0:
10Probit model is simple to model and estimation is by maximum likelihood because the
distribution of the data is dened by Bernoulli model. The MLE is consistent if the conditional
density of dependent variable y given the regressors X is correctly specied. Therefore, the
MLE is consistent if pi = (X0i) and it is inconsistent otherwise.
11Maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters can be time consuming with large
datasets and the Heckit estimates can provide good alternative in such cases. The estimators
from a Heckit model are consistent and asymptotically normal.
12 In the Heckit model all we need to assume is that 1and 2 are independent of independent
variables with mean zero and that 2  N [0; 1].
13The net e¤ective wage is dened as the gross wage net of taxes and transfers.
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of working. The labor force participation decision in its functional form can be
dened as:
INLFi = f((1   i)wi; yi;Zi) (31)
For estimating the wage e¤ect on the labor force participation decision, I am
using the following approximation for the optimal number of hours of work h0i ,
that is chosen by each individual i :
h0i =  ln ((1   i)wi) + Z0i+"i (32)
where "i is an error term that is assumed to be independent and normally
distributed across individuals with the mean zero and variance 2", "i  N(0; 2"):
The probability of labor force participation for an individual i is dened as:
Pr (INLFi = 1) = Pr(h
0
i > 0) (33)
= Pr( ln ((1   i)wi) + Z0i+"i > 0)
Assuming the particular distributional form for the error term, "i, we can esti-
mate the standard probit model for the labor participation decision:
Pr (INLFi = 1j(1   i)wi;Z) = ( ln ((1   i)wi) + Z0i+"i > 0) (34)
= ("i >  ( ln ((1   i)wi) + Z0i)
= 1 ("i >  ( ln ((1   i)wi) + Z0i)
= ( ln((1   i)wi) + Z0i)
where () denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Due
to non-linearity of the functional form in the model, one needs to calculate
the marginal e¤ects at the means of regressors or at some other interesting
values of the regressors in order to make valid interpretations of its partial
e¤ects. In line with the ILO denition of employment, I specied the binary
labor force participation indicator to one, INLFi = 1; for an individuals i
who are employed or currently unemployed but actively search for employment
and INLFi = 0 for those who are neither unemployed nor seek employment.
Focusing on the estimation of labor supply in partial equilibrium setting I have
not considered the relevance of demand side of labor market. This approach
opens up the eld for criticism because the labor force participation decision can
be inuenced by the demand for work. One attempt to take into consideration
the constraints on the demand side, following the approach in the literature,
was to include the regional unemployment rates for each country. However, the
inclusion of local unemployment rates in estimation was abandoned after nding
out its very strong serial correlation with other regressors in the model.
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The main interest in the model is to estimate the parameter on wage regres-
sor, , that represents the wage semi-elasticity of labor force participation14 .
Dividing the wage semi-elasticity by the probability of labor force participation
one can obtain the wage elasticity. The estimation from the probit model follows
two di¤erent treatments; rst treatment is with the gross hourly wage regressor
and second treatment is with the net e¤ective wage regressor. The analysis of
the incentives or disincentives of the welfare system is based on the marginal
e¤ect between the two treatments on the probability of being employed. In the
following section I explain the derivation of the wage regressor. Additionally,
the probit model includes other income variable, variables describing house-
hold characteristics, education and binary race variable15 . In the literature, the
marginal e¤ects of wage and socio-demographic regressors on the probability of
labor supply are di¤ers between the two genders. Respecting these empirical
ndings I estimated the model separately by men and women.
3.3 Empirical wage specications
The model outlined in the previous subsection predicts the probability for being
in the workforce by using observations on actual wage or conditional wage for
every individual. Typically it is not possible to observe wages for non-workers
and this poses a problem for modelling behavioural responses. For those indi-
viduals who do not work I estimate the expected market wage rate that can be
used in place of missing wage observations. Using the Heckman (1979) sample
selection model I estimate the wage equation for a fraction of workers whose
wages were observed, conditioning on the labor force participation. The two
equations system is estimated as a two step Heckman selection model. The er-
ror terms from wage and selection equations are assumed to be correlated, which
is also supported by the model16 . The estimated wage equation that accounts
for sample selection bias then predicts the gross hourly wage for workers and
non-workers. The following estimation procedure is applied separatedly to men
and women.
When estimating the labor force participation with the probit model I use
two constructions, the predicted gross hourly wage and the e¤ective net hourly
wage. The e¤ective net hourly wage is derived by subtracting taxes and transfers
from the gross hourly wage. To avoid identication problems in the Heckman
sample selection model, at least one regressor must be unique in both equations.
Therefore the selectivity equation will contain at least one variable that is not
used for the wage estimation. As the regressors on the right-hand side of the
wage equation that by assumption does not have an impact on the labor force
participation decision, I use age of the worker, binary indicators for education,
race binary indicator and regional binary variables. For selection equation I
14The marginal e¤ect of wage on the probability of supplying labor is given by , as wage
regressor is expressed in the logarithm.
15The detail denition of the variables is provided in the subsection A.1 in the Appendix
A.
16See the Appendix B for a full specication of the Heckman model.
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use demographic regressors like age, marital status, race, variable indicating the
presence of children in particular age, regional binary variables, other income
variable and binary education indicator. The exclusion restrictions have been
tested with the standardized z statistic on the signicance of regressors in wage
and selection equation. When a particular regressor in estimation is insigni-
cant in a preliminary regression then this variable will not be included in the
estimation of the nal model. I use the bootstrap method to derive the standard
errors of the sampling distribution of estimated coe¢ cients in the probit regres-
sion of the labor force participation and in computing its marginal e¤ects. The
main reason for bootstrapping comes from the fact that in the estimation I use
predicted wage observations. The bootstrap method consider the sample as the
population to derive properties of the sampling distribution of the estimators.
After predicting the gross hourly wage17 I derived the second wage speci-
cation, the net e¤ective wage. Generating the net e¤ective wage follows this
equation:
NEWi = (1   i)GRWi (35)
where NEWi is the net e¤ective wage for an individual i, GRWi is the gross
wage for an individual i and  i denotes the e¤ective marginal tax rate for an
individual i. Construction of the e¤ective marginal tax rate  i is given by:
 i = 1  GRWi  NWi
GRWi
(36)
where NWi denotes the predicted net hourly wage, i.e. predicted gross hourly
wage minus taxation. One of disadvantages of this approach is that it does not
take into a consideration subtraction of possible social security transfers from
the predicted gross hourly wage. Moreover, construction of  i does not take into
account the di¤erences between the social benets (parental allowance, housing
benets, child benets, maternity allowances, etc) to which an individual is
entitled when employed or unemployed.
17The sample provides informations on total hours worked by an individual and the gross
earned income from the main job and any second jobs. Both variables are measured on the
weekly basis at the time of the interview. To construct total annual working hours I have
multiplied weekly working hours by 52 what is the number of weeks in a year. The same
approach was applied to construct the annual gross income.
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4 Data
4.1 The description of the dataset
The data used in this thesis comes from the General Household Survey (GHS)
conducted on an annual basis, by the Social Survey Division of the O¢ ce for
National Statistics (ONS). The main aim of the survey is to collect data on a
range of core topics, covering household, family and individual information on
earnings as well as social and demographic characteristics18 . This information
is used by government departments and other organisations for planning, policy
and monitoring purposes, and to present a picture of households, family and
people in Great Britain. The GHS aims to interview all adults aged 16 or over
at every household at the sampled address19 . It uses a probability, stratied
two-stage sample design. The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) are postcode
sectors, which are similar in size to wards and the secondary sampling units are
addresses within those sectors20 . Since April 1994, the GHS has been conducted
on a nancial year basis, with eldwork spread evenly across the year April-
March. However, in 2005 the survey period reverted to a calendar year and
the whole of the annual sample was dealt with in the nine months April to
December 200521 . Since the 2005 survey does not cover the January-March
quarter, this a¤ects annual estimates for topics which are subject to seasonal
variation. To rectify this, where the questions were the same in 2005 as in
2004-05, the nal quarter of the 2004-05 survey has been added (weighted in
the correct proportion) to the nine months of the 2005 survey.
The dataset is representative of the population of Great Britain and con-
tains 30,069 individual interviews in 12,802 households. The survey contains
comprehensive and redundant observations about gross income, net income and
wealth. Therefore the Division of ONS have already recovered gross incomes us-
ing proper tax benet simulation for every individual which makes this dataset
suitable for appropriate estimation of the labour supply. For modeling the labor
supply behaviour I select a subsample of the whole population where a selected
subsample do not contains individuals younger than 16 and older than 60 years
old, self-employed and fully disabled people. In the labor supply models, the
heterogeneity of agents behaviour becomes more di¢ cult to estimate with the
model that is previously described and that is why the sample restrictions are
necessary. Individuals that are self-employed are excluded because it is di¢ -
cult to explain the behaviour of self-employed individual that is not working.
What is ambiguous here for the self-employment status is that we do not ob-
serve whether the individuals that are not working would have worked as a
self-employed or as a dependent worker if the decision to work has been made.
The rationale for other exclusion follows a disbelief that those individuals be-
have in the standard trade o¤ sense between leisure and income. After ltering
18O¢ ce for National Statistics: November 2007
19O¢ ce for National Statistics: November 2007
20O¢ ce for National Statistics: November 2007
21O¢ ce for National Statistics: November 2007
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out all the non-complying individuals the estimation sample consists of 9,792
individuals; 4,392 men and 5,400 women living in 6,746 households. The dataset
used in estimation is summarized in the table 1.
Table 1: Summary statistics: Men and Women
Men Women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Labor force participation .9353370 .2459583 .7637037 .4248456
Age 40.13957 11.64261 40.17148 11.53118
Education .8469945 .3600338 .8314815 .3743608
Non-white .0810565 .2729529 .0903704 .2867382
Married .5580601 .4966741 .5662963 .4956312
Other income 14,33169 17,32207 20,44055 29,68035
Children 0-4 Years .1657559 .3719037 .2074074 .4054874
Children 5-15 Years .2868852 .452359 .3461111 .4757732
Observations 4,392 5,400
Notes: Other income represents summation of individuals non-labor income and
income of other household members, measured after taxation in thousands of GBP.
4.2 Description of the variables
The gender specic variables are presented for males and females as the estima-
tion is done seperately by gender. The detail denition of all the variables are
described in subsection A1 of the appendix A. As we can see, male and female
participation rates in the sample are 93.5 and 76.3 percent, respectively. The
unemployment rates are 4.5 percent for men and 2.6 percent for women22 .This
implies economical inactivity rate of 6.5 percent and 23.7 percent for men and
women, respectively.
The average household member is 40 years old, with the men being about
the same age as the women. About 56 percent of the individuals are married
and they are living with their partners23 . Households inhabited by males own
on average 279 GBP per week while the households inhabited by females own
on average 393 GBP per week. About 85 percent of men and 83 percent of
women have any form of qualication while on average both genders have 11
years of education. The distribution of children aged up to 5 years and children
aged from 5 up to 15 years is 16 percent and 29 percent for the households
inhabitated by men.
For the households inhabitated by women the distribution of children aged
up to 5 years and children aged from 5 to 15 years is 21 percent and 35 percent,
respectively. The substantial di¤erence in the labor force participation across
22The unemployment rate is dened as the share of the unemployed over the sum of em-
ployed and unemployed.
23The denition of being married presuposes that an individual is legally married and live
in cohabitation with the partner.
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gender is implied in total hours worked, where on average men worked more than
13 hours per week than women. The distribution of men and women weekly
working hours is presented in the histogram in the the Figure 1.
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Distribution of weekly working hours for men and women
As we can see a spike at zero in both distributions showing the non par-
ticipation but more pronouncing spike appears for women. The distribution
of working hours implies that the men tend to work mostly around the mean
value of 35 hours per week (apart from non participation) whereas the womens
working distribution unfold a form of part time employment. Probably there
exists a degree of exibility in employment contracts on female labor market
that causes relatively non negligible distribution of working hours within the
part-time region. The gross hourly wage of employed women in the sample
was 10.91 GBP what is less than the gross hourly wage of employed men that
amounts 15.40 GBP, on average. The distribution of the gross hourly wage of
employed men shows greater inequality in comparison with women, where more
than 70 percent of men are below the mean value of gross hourly wage. The
skewness of gross hourly wage distribution for women is less emphasized with
about 60 percent of women are below the mean value of gross hourly wage.
Non parametric density estimates are used for comparison between di¤erent
gender groups. The nonparametric representation of logarithm of the gross
hourly wage for men and women by histogram is less smooth than with kernel
estimation. The distribution of the gross hourly wage was right-skewed and
we can model logarithm of the hourly gross wage. The logarithmic wage data
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Figure 1: Histogram of the gross hourly wage for men and women
for both genders seem to be quite symmetric around the mean value. The
mean of logarithmic hourly gross wage is 2.44 and 2.18 for men and women,
respectively. A distribution of logarithmic gross hourly wage for men and women
is represented in the Figure 2.
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5 Results
This section provides the results from the Heckman model for the wage equation
and the results from the participation model. I analyze the results from both
models where in addition for the probit model, the marginal e¤ects is computed
and discussed.
5.1 Heckman sample selection model results
It is crucial to check whether the selection in Heckit model is based on unobserv-
able characteristics. If the error terms, 1and 2, are correlated in the Heckit
model after conditioning on other right hand side variables, then the selection
two step approach is justied. The participation and wage equation implies
that unobserved factors that make someone to work more may also make them
to work longer that it would be predicted. The presence of unobservable char-
acteristics has been tested in the model and the results conrmed presence of
sample selection bias.
Table 8 and table 9 presents the estimated parameters in log-linear model for
the gross wage, that take into account for potential sample selection bias24 . Us-
ing the Heckit model I focus on modeling logarithmic wage for those in employ-
ment. The inverse Mills ratio term is statistically signicant for men, z =  3:10
and for women, z =  2:61 which implies the presence of sample selection bias.
Moreover, the magnitude of the inverse Mills ratio term is almost one for men,
^ =  0:985 and it is lower for women, ^ =  0:232. The t-statistics on regional
indicators in the selection equation are mostly insignicant either for men or
women, which implies that regions does not a¤ect the participation in labor
force. However, the regional binary variables are highly signicant in wage
equation for both genders. All demographic variables except the educational
binary variable for women and other income variable are statistically signicant
and therefore have their impact on the wage o¤ered. The presence of children
in the household does not seem to have an e¤ect for male participation25 in
the market. In contrast with men, the presence of children has a negative and
signicant e¤ect for women. Regarding marital status, there is no e¤ect on
participation for either men or women.
After predicting the logarithmic wages for men and women by the Heckit
model, one can make the comparison of predicted wages and actual wages for
those that participate in the labor market. The results for working men in the
table 10 imply that the average predictions of the logarithmic wages from the
Heckit model are exactly the same in mean as the actual wages. The last line
24The OLS standard errors and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in the Heckit
model are not correct because the error term, i, su¤ers from heteroscedasticity since the
truncated variance of the dependent variable is heteroscedastic. Although, Heckman (1979)
provided the expressions for the correct standard error they are not used in estimation. Rather,
I used the empirical bootstrap method with 500 replications to correct for the heteroscedas-
ticity of errors.
25The presence of children until 4 years old has a statistically signicant e¤ect at 10 percent
for men participation in the market.
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in table 10 shows that without taking the sample selection bias into account,
on average logarithmic wages for working men are over predicted. The same
predictions have been made for woman and the results are summarized in table
11. Again, the average predictions of the logarithmic wages for women from
the Heckit model are perfectly matching with the mean of observed wages.
Comparing the mean linear predictions of the logarithmic wage for women with
the actual logarithmic wage reveals that the former wages are over predicted
on average. When comparing the mean of linear over prediction from the mean
of actual wages by gender, for women this accounts 0.45 GBP while for men
accounts 1.72 GBP.
The Heckit conditional wage predictions are made for all individuals in the
sample but they can be compared only with observed wages for those in em-
ployment. However, we can be interested in comparing the mean of wages for
all men and women whether they participate in paid work or not. The mean
of the Heckit conditional predictions of wages and the mean of observed wages
for all men in the sample are presented in table 1226 . One can note that the
predictions from the Heckit model for the gross hourly wages are similar to the
mean of observed gross hourly wages. The mean of the Heckit predicted gross
hourly wage for those men in paid work are larger for about 2.53 GBP than
the same prediction for all men in the sample. This result is nevertheless ex-
pected because when predicting the gross hourly wage for all men by the Heckit
method, the cumulative distribution function that measures the probability of
being in the labor force is smaller than one.
Comparing the mean gross hourly wages predicted by the Heckit and actual
gross hourly wage shows that these two are very similar for women. On average
the Heckit predicted gross hourly wage for employed women are larger then the
Heckit prediction by about 2.63 GBP. These results are presented in the table
13.
5.2 The participation decision model results
The wage equation from the Heckit model predicted the wages for non-workers
whose wages were not observed. The actual and predicted gross hourly wages
were used to derive the e¤ective net hourly wages27 that will be used as the main
regressor in estimating the labor force participation rates. The probability of
working is estimated with the probit model and the results are presented in the
table 14 and table 15 for the gross wage specication and in the table 16 and
table 17 for the net e¤ective wage specication.
There are two specications of the probit model, one with the logarithmic
gross hourly wage and the other with the logarithmic e¤ective net hourly wage.
Comparing the goodness of t with 2 statistics (of the Wald test whether
all coe¢ cients except the constant) across two specications of a model, the
26One should note that these predictions are in wage levels not in the logarithm. For
comparison, observed wage for those who are determined by participation equation as non-
participants, are set to zero.
27As it was explained in part 3.3.
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specication with the e¤ective net wage performs approximately the same as the
specication with the gross wage and that is for both gender. The comparison of
t based on the pseudo-R2 shows equivalence for both specications within the
gender but marginally better performance for women when comparing between
gender. The positive sign on wage coe¢ cients for men and negative coe¢ cients
for women indicate that the probability of supplying labor will increase for
men and decrease for women if there is a change in the wage. One reason
for that might be that men will substitute away leisure for work due to greater
substitution than income e¤ect, and women will do the opposite by substituting
work for leisure due to greater income e¤ect. The positive sign on age coe¢ cient
implies that labor supply is increasing with age but there is a point above which
the age has negative e¤ect on the probability of working (marginal decreasing
returns on age are present). The e¤ect of education on probability of working
is signicant only for women and positive impliying that educated women are
more likely to work in contrast with women without education. The presence of
children reduces mens and womens probability of employment and the e¤ect
decreases with the childrens age. However, the presence of children older than
four years has no e¤ect on mens decision to work. As probably expected, non-
labor income has negative e¤ect on the probability of employment, although
the e¤ect is insignicant for women and marginally signicant for men. Positive
coe¢ cient on marital status indicates higher probability of working for married
people than non-married, however there is no e¤ect for women. The probability
of working increases for white men and women in contrast with non-whites28 .
5.3 Elasticity results
While one can draw inferences about the sign and signicance of the regressors
from the probit model by looking at the coe¢ cients, the magnitude of these
e¤ects cannot be read directly. Therefore, the marginal e¤ects need to be calcu-
lated at either at the mean or other interesting value of variables. The marginal
probit e¤ects are not constant like in the usual OLS regression model but they
di¤er in size due to the non-linearity of the probit model. After estimating the
probit model for labor force participation, the marginal e¤ects are calculated
and presented in the table 2 and table 3 for men and women, respectively.
These e¤ects were calculated at the means of the variables29 . However,
the means of the marginal e¤ects computed for each individual is presented in
addition. The rst row of the table 2 and table 3 shows the wage semi-elasticity
28The e¤ects on country binary variables are not signicant for women. The joint and
individual signicance of the binary variables, Wales and Scotland were checked by likelihood
ratio test and z-statistics. The former test showed no signicant joint e¤ect at 10 percent
signicance level for womens sample.
29Marginal e¤ects of continuous regressors are computed by using the probability density
function at the mean values of regressors. Marginal e¤ects of discrete regressors are computed
as a change in the normal cumulative density functions evaluated at the zero and one for the
particular discrete variable for which the change is made.
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of labor supply30 . When comparing either the gross wage semi-elasticity or
the net e¤ective wage semi-elasticity across gender, they are both larger for
men than for women. The gross wage has signicant e¤ect on male labor force
participation decision implying that a one percent increase in gross hourly wage
increases the probability of supplying labor by 0.0951 percentage point for men
with the average characteristics in the sample.
In contrast with men, increasing the gross wage will reduce the probability
of supplying labor for women by 0.0285 percentage point, however the e¤ect is
not signicant. Calculating the mean marginal e¤ects31 , by dividing the wage
semi-elasticities with the predicted probability of labor force participation at
means of variables, the gross wage elasticities are 0.1046 and -0.0373 for men
and women, respectively32 .
Evaluating the marginal e¤ect of additional age at the average value of vari-
ables in the sample33 increases the probability of supplying labor for 0.02 and
0.06 percentage point for men and women, respectively. The marginal dimin-
ishing e¤ect of age is signicant and it present for men and women. While
education does not have signicant e¤ect on male labor supply, its e¤ect is
signicant and pronounced for women implying that the probability of being
employed for women with at least high school educational attainment34 is by
0.12 higher than for women without high school. The negative marginal e¤ect
on race binary indicator implies that the probability of labor supply is higher
by 0.09 and 0.20 for white men and women, conditional on the averages of
other characteristics. The e¤ect of non-labor income, although not signicant
for both genders, has the expected sign. The probability of supplying labor
30Wage semi-elasticity of labor supply, !, is dened as the following expression:
! =
@ Pr(INLF = 1)
@ logwage
=
@ Pr(INLF = 1)
@wage
 wage
that can be interpreted as the wage marginal e¤ect on the probability of supplying labor,
mfx =
@ Pr(INLF = 1)
@ logwage
=  ( ln(wage) +X) 
where  () denotes the standard normal density function. We can interpret these e¤ects as:
a one percent increase in wage, increases the probability of supplying labor by (1=100)mfx:
31Mean wage marginal e¤ect or wage elasticity can be expressed as:
 =
@ Pr(INLF = 1)
@wage
 wage
Pr(INLF = 1)
=
!
Pr(INLF = 1)
The wage elasticity is calculated by using ! and the predicted probability of labor force
participation, Pr(INLF = 1).
32The wage elasticity for men is close to wage semi-elasticity because the predicted labor
force participation is 0.9088 or 90.88 percent. While for women, the wage semi-elasticity is
larger then the wage elasticity due to the predicted labor force participation of 0.7643 or 76.43
percent.
33The average age for men and women in the sample is approximately the same, that is 40
years old.
34Again the e¤ect is measured at the average values of variables in the sample.
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Table 2: Marginal E¤ects-Men
Gross Wage Net E¤ective Wage
Variable Mfx Std error Mfx Std error
Log Wage 0.0951 0.0516 0.1043 0.0525
Age 0.0236 0.0037 0.0232 0.0041
Age2 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000
Educationa 0.0102 0.0175 0.0090 0.0172
Non-whitea -0.0944 0.0225 -0.0973 0.0220
Other income -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0002
Children 0-4 Yearsa -0.0272 0.0154 -0.0271 0.0152
Children 5-15 Yearsa -0.0138 0.0111 -0.0138 0.0117
Marrieda 0.0760 0.0114 0.0761 0.0114
N 4,392 4,392
Log-likelihood -1383.6852 -1383.6771
2(9) 275.92 275.93
Notes: Marginal e¤ects computed at the means of regressors. Discrete change denoted by a.
Statistical signicance is calculated using bootstrap standard errors, 500 replications.
Table 3: Marginal E¤ects-Women
Gross Wage Net E¤ective Wage
Variable Mfx Std error Mfx Std error
Log Wage -0.0285 0.0617 -0.0152 0.0730
Age 0.0611 0.0054 0.0603 0.0054
Age2 -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0001
Educationa 0.1205 0.0299 0.1146 0.0285
Non-whitea -0.1988 0.0250 -0.2006 0.0238
Other income -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003
Children 0-4 Yearsa -0.3318 0.0187 -0.3319 0.0184
Children 5-15 Yearsa -0.1900 0.0154 -0.1898 0.0154
Marrieda 0.0034 0.0132 0.0035 0.0130
N 5,400 5,400
Log-likelihood -2707.2384 -2707.3228
2(9) 805.70 805.53
Notes: Marginal e¤ects computed at the means of regressors. Discrete change denoted by a.
Statistical signicance is calculated using bootstrap standard errors, 500 replications.
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decreases for men and women that have children while the e¤ect is far more
intense for women than the men. Probability that a female with the average
characteristics in the sample supply labor is lower by 0.33 if the children below
for years old is present in the household. While marital status has no signicant
e¤ect for womens labor supply, married mens have higher probability of being
participating in the labor force than unmarried.
The following results are based on the second specication using net ef-
fective wage rate and evaluating marginal e¤ects at the average of regressors.
The semi-elasticities of labor force participation with respect to net e¤ective
wage are larger than the semi-elasticities with respect to gross wage, for men
and women. The e¤ect is signicant for men and implies that a one percent
increase in net e¤ective wage increases the probability of supplying labor by
0.1043 percentage point. For women the semi-elasticity is negative, implying
that one percent rise in net e¤ective wage decreases the probability of labor
supply by 0.0152 percentage point. However, the e¤ect for women is insignif-
icant at even 10 percent signicance level. The net e¤ective wage elasticities
calculated as mean marginal e¤ects are 0.1148 and -0.0199 for men and women,
respectively. Again, the wage elasticity is closer to wage semi-elasticity for men
than for women because the predicted probability of labor force participation
is larger for men than for women. The marginal e¤ects of socio-demographic
characteristics on labor force participation are the same magnitude and sign in
net e¤ective wage specication as for the gross wage specication. The marginal
e¤ect of education in net e¤ective wage specication is marginally lower than
with gross wage specication, for both gender. The probability of supplying
labor for men and women with white ethnic background is marginally larger in
net wage specication than with gross wage specication in comparison with
non-whites.
Analyzing the wage elasticities for di¤erent wage specication, the net ef-
fective wage elasticities are larger than the gross wage elasticities for both gen-
der, although wage elasticities show no signicant e¤ect on labor supply for
women. One reason for greater net e¤ective wage elasticities can be determined
by greater equality of net e¤ective wage distribution among the individuals.
This e¤ect can be achieved by marginal e¤ective tax rate created by a state or
local authorities when seeking for a greater contributions in social transfers and
progressive taxation of personal income.
Hypothetically assuming that all individuals in male sample and female sam-
ple are married, the following results are obtained by computing the wage semi-
elasticity of labor supply. That is to say, these marginal e¤ects are measuring
the labor supply response to both wage specications when there is no unmar-
ried male or female in the sample. Comparison of the predicted probabilities of
labor supply for married individuals are than compared to the predicted proba-
bilities of labor supply that are measured on the averages of the variables. The
di¤erence between the marginal response of two wage specications in hypo-
thetical example stays with the same sign and magnitude35 as in the di¤erence
35However, the di¤erence between the gross and the net e¤ective marginal e¤ects becomes
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Table 4: Marginal E¤ects for Married-Men
Gross Wage Net E¤ective Wage
Variable Mfx Std error Mfx Std error
Log Wage 0.0718 0.0361 0.0787 0.0394
Age 0.0178 0.0033 0.0175 0.0033
Age2 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000
Educationa 0.0078 0.0138 0.0068 0.0140
Non-whitea -0.0743 0.0195 -0.0766 0.0187
Other income -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0002
Children 0-4 Yearsa -0.0207 0.0111 -0.0207 0.0117
Children 5-15 Yearsa -0.0104 0.0081 -0.0105 0.0083
N 4,392 4,392
Log-likelihood -1383.6852 -1383.6771
2(9) 275.92 275.93
Notes: Marginal e¤ects computed at the means of regressors. Discrete change denoted by a.
Statistical signicance is calculated using bootstrap standard errors, 500 replications.
Table 5: Marginal E¤ects for Married-Women
Gross Wage Net E¤ective Wage
Variable Mfx Std error Mfx Std error
Log Wage -0.0284 0.0617 -0.0152 0.0736
Age 0.0608 0.0054 0.0601 0.0055
Age2 -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0001
Educationa 0.1202 0.0305 0.1142 0.0324
Non-whitea -0.1984 0.0250 -0.2001 0.0250
Other income -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002
Children 0-4 Yearsa -0.3311 0.0177 -0.3312 0.0186
Children 5-15 Yearsa -0.1892 0.0150 -0.1893 0.0150
N 5,400 5,400
Log-likelihood -2707.2384 -2707.3228
2(9) 805.70 805.53
Notes: Marginal e¤ects computed at the means of regressors. Discrete change denoted by a.
Statistical signicance is calculated using bootstrap standard errors, 500 replications.
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in the marginal responses measured at the average of variables. However, the
magnitude of marginal e¤ects for both wage specications are smaller when as-
suming only married men relatively in comparison with the average value for
marital status variable in the sample. The results are presented in table 4 and
table 5.
A one percentage point rise in gross wage increases the probability of sup-
plying labor by 0.0718 percentage point for men in the hypothetical example,
while the same e¤ect was 0.0951 when measuring the e¤ect on the average of
marital status variable. The disincentive e¤ect by comparing these two scenar-
ios is 25 percent. For net e¤ective wage specication, a one percent increase in
wage for men, raises the probability of labor supply by 0.0787 in hypothetical
case, while on the average of marital status variable the same e¤ect was 0.1043.
The disincentive e¤ect of these two scenarios is 25 percent. The marginal wage
e¤ects on the predicted probability of labor supply in the hypothetical scenario
for women stay the same as the marginal wage e¤ects on the predicted proba-
bility of labor supply when the e¤ects are calculated at the means of variables.
The estimated e¤ects of other socio-demographic characteristics of labor force
participation for both wage specications and across genders, are the same sign
and approximately the same size in two scenarios that were recently presented.
Illustration of marginal e¤ects of marital status on labor supply over the
whole sample distribution is presented by computing the predicted probabilities
of labor force participation. Cumulative distribution function is evaluated at
the sample means of regressors and with the two values for variable represent-
ing marital status, where estimated coe¢ cients of variables follow the coe¢ -
cients estimated from the probit model. Figures 3 and 4 presents the predicted
probabilities as a function of wage for both wage specications and across both
genders. The marginal e¤ect of variable indicating the marital status is given
by di¤erence between the two functions.The probability that the labor force
participation will increase for men after marriage is substantially greater for
men with low level of wages than those with high level of wages. However, over
the whole wage distribution, the probability of supplying labor will be greater
for married than for unmarried men. At around of net e¤ective wage level that
equals 4 GBP (per hour), the estimated probability of supplying labor will be
72 percent for unmarried men and 85 percent for married men. At the wage
level of around 15 GBP, the estimated probability of labor supply is 91 and 96
percent for unmarried and married men, respectively. The marginal change in
the estimated probability of being employed does not di¤er for female marital
status over the wage distribution. For every wage level the probability of being
employed is higher for married than the unmarried women. At the net e¤ective
wage level of 4 GBP the predicted probability of working is around 77 percent
and it is marginally di¤erent between married and unmarried women. Interest-
ingly, at the higher wage level of around 9 GBP, the predicted probability of
working falls by approximately 1.5 percentage points for unmarried women and
by 1.2 percentage points for married women.
marginally smaller when assuming all married men in the sample.
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Figure 2: Predicted labor force participation rates for married and unmarried
men
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Figure 3: Predicted labor force participation for married and unmarred women
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Table 6: Marginal E¤ects by Gross Wage and Gender
Wage Men Women
Quartile Wage (GBP) Mfx Wage (GBP) Mfx
Q1 Below 8.2293 0.7255 Below 6.2644 0.0660
Q2 Below 9.4743 0.8526 Below 7.1832 -0.4504
Q3 Below 10.3399 0.5585 Below 7.7168 -0.3444
Q4 Above 10.3399 0.0904 Above 7.7168 0.0283
All 0.1047 -0.0373
Notes: Averages of marginal e¤ects in each quintile. Statistical signicance is calculated using
bootstrap standard errors, 10 replications.
The marginal e¤ects presented so far are evaluated at the means of the
variables to illustrate the partial e¤ects of an individual with the average char-
acteristics on the probability of labor supply. Table 6 and table 7 represents the
estimated wage semi-elasticities for given quartiles of hourly wage.
The semi-elasticities in these two tables are computed within quartiles on
averages of regressors and at the end total averages of the marginal e¤ects
are evaluated for each individual. When comparing the total marginal e¤ects
presented in the last row of these two tables with the marginal e¤ects in the
table 2 and table 3, we can notice that the di¤erence in computing marginal
e¤ects at means or means of marginal e¤ects is negligible. Computing the
marginal e¤ects at means is preferable for having the correct standard errors
that were obtained through the bootstrap method. The wage semi-elasticity
decreases with the wage levels for both specications and both genders when
comparing the rst and the fourth quartile but the results for the second and
third quartile are more ambiguous. For both specications and both genders,
the wage elasticities in the second and third quartiles are more pronounced
than the other quartiles. The cross-quartile di¤erences are more pronounced
in absolute values for men than for women for gross wage specication but the
opposite is true for the net e¤ective wage specication. The semi-elasticity of
labor force of men with respect to the e¤ective net wage in the rst quartile is, in
absolute terms more than twice the wage semi-elasticity in forth quartile, while
for gross wage specication the marginal e¤ect in rst quartile is eight times the
response in fourth quartile. A one percent increase in the gross wage raises the
labor force participation of men in the rst quartile by 72.55 percentage points,
which is almost seven times the overall average marginal response. In the net
e¤ective wage specication, a one percent increase in the wage, increases the
labor force participation of men in the rst quartile by 9.89 percentage points,
which is below the overall average marginal response.
The semi-elasticity of labor force of women with respect to the e¤ective net
wage in the rst quartile is about four times greater than the wage semi-elasticity
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Table 7: Marginal E¤ects by Net E¤ective Wage and Gender
Wage Men Women
Quartile Wage (GBP) Mfx Wage (GBP) Mfx
Q1 Below 8.2293 0.0989 Below 6.2644 0.3204
Q2 Below 9.4743 0.4116 Below 7.1832 -0.1003
Q3 Below 10.3399 0.4593 Below 7.7168 -0.5305
Q4 Above 10.3399 -0.0402 Above 7.7168 0.0882
All 0.1148 -0.0199
Notes: Averages of marginal e¤ects in each quintile. Statistical signicance calculated using
bootstrap standard errors, 500 replications
in fourth quartile, while for gross wage specication the marginal response in
the rst quartile is three times greater that the response in fourth quartile. A
one percent increase in the gross wage raises the labor force participation of
men in the rst quartile by 6.60 percentage point, which is twice in absolute
terms than the overall average marginal e¤ect. Considering the net e¤ective
wage specication, a one percent increase in the wage increases the labor force
participation of women in the rst quartile by 32.04 percentage point, which
is, in absolute terms is about sixteen times the overall average marginal ef-
fect.The wage -elasticity of women is distributed more equally within quartiles
with the gross wage semi-elasticity ranges in the absolute terms from 0.0660 in
the rst quartile to 0.0283 in the forth quartile, the net e¤ective semi-wage elas-
ticity range is from 0.3204 to 0.0882 in absolute terms. The di¤erence between
the gross and net e¤ective wage elasticities measured with the overall average
marginal e¤ect is an evidence for the Britains improving welfare system. The
system of taxes, social security contributions and social benets encourages the
labour force participation more than in the case when this incentives will not
be present. Computing the di¤erence between the marginal e¤ects for the gross
and net e¤ective wage specications, the tax-benet system encouragements are
larger for women36 than for men. The marginal e¤ect of the e¤ective net wage
on labor force participation is larger than the e¤ect of the gross wage by 47 per-
cent for women while both elasticities are negative. This means that the welfare
system disincentives are lower than if we consider no existence of such a system.
For men, the marginal e¤ect of net e¤ective wage is larger than the e¤ect of the
gross wage by 10 percent. In contrast with women, this net marginal e¤ect is
positive for males, implying the existence of welfare incentives. The interpre-
tation of the di¤erences between the two wage specications across the wage
quartiles is more ambiguous because for men all four wage quartiles show the
disincentive e¤ect of welfare system while the overall e¤ect shows the opposite.
However, the comparison of the results from overall marginal e¤ect di¤erences
36However, this is only true when measuring the di¤erence in a way of reducing the disin-
centives on wage marginal e¤ects for women. Nevertheless, the net e¤ective wage marginal
e¤ect for women is larger than the gross wage marginal e¤ect but its sign is negative.
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among the gross and net e¤ective wage, the Britains welfare system reduces
the disincentives for women and increases incentives for male labor supply. As
previously stated, the estimated e¤ects of other social and demographic deter-
minants of labor force participation shows similar e¤ects to those reported in
the literature. Alternative determinant of income that is earned by the workers
are introduced with the other income covariate. Therefore, the coe¢ cients on
the other income variable captures the income e¤ect that appears as negative
for both gender, although very small in magnitude and insignicant for women.
The e¤ect of education is positive on labor force participation for women, while
the e¤ect of children is more negatively pronounced for women than for men.
The sign and signicance of the marginal e¤ects are very similar for two spec-
ications within the gender. The estimated wage elasticities are negative and
small for women and larger for men, are contrasting recent ndings that the
overall wage sensitivity for women is greater than for men.
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6 Conclusion
In this thesis I have analyzed the performance of the participation decision
model by examining the importance of the extensive margin of labor supply
for men and women using the General Household Survey that collects data
about private households in Great Britain. While wages for those who do not
work are not observed, I follow Heckman (1979) and estimate a wage equation
controlling for the selection into employment. I estimate wage semi-elasticity
and wage elasticity of labor force participation using the predicted gross hourly
wages for everybody in the sample. In the second specication, I estimate
wage semi-elasticity and wage elasticity with respect to the net e¤ective wage,
which is generated from the gross wage but taking into account the taxes and
benets for each individual in the sample. I nd that a one percent increase
in the e¤ective net wage increases the male labor force participation rate by a
0.1043 percentage point and decreases the female labor force participation rate
by 0.0152 percentage point. When I use the gross wage specication, the wage
semi-elasticities are 0.0951 for men and -0.0285 for women. However, both the
gross and the net e¤ective wage semi-elasticities are not signicant even at 10
percent signicance level.
Calculating the mean marginal e¤ects (wage elasticity), by dividing the wage
semi-elasticity with the predicted probability of labor force participation at
means of regressors , the gross wage (the net e¤ective) elasticities are 0.1046
(0.1148) and -0.0373 (-0.0199) for men and women, respectively. Wage elastic-
ities are closer to wage semi-elasticities for men than for women because the
predicted labor force participation rate is closer to one for men then for women.
The following results imply that for men the marginal e¤ect of the net e¤ective
wage on labor force participation is higher than the e¤ect of gross wage by 10
percent, which I interpret as existence of welfare system incentives. For women,
the marginal e¤ect of the net e¤ective wage on labor force participation is higher
than the e¤ect of gross wage by 47 percent, although both e¤ects were nega-
tive. This implies that the welfare system disincentives for women are lower
compared to the case of no welfare system. The results are more ambiguous
to interpret when the wage semi-elasticities are computed for a particular wage
quartile. The wage semi-elasticity decreases with the wage levels for both wage
specications and for both genders when comparing the rst and the fourth
quartile but the results for the second and third quartile are more ambiguous.
For both wage specications and for both genders, the wage elasticities in the
second and third quartiles are more pronounced than the other quartiles.
Assuming that all individuals in the sample are married, I computed the
wage semi-elasticity of labor supply for this hypothetical example. The di¤er-
ence between the marginal response of two wage specications in hypothetical
example stays with the same size and sing as in the di¤erence in the marginal
responses measured at the average of variables. The estimated e¤ects of social
and demographic variables on labor force participation show similar e¤ects that
can be nd in the literature. The e¤ect of education has positive e¤ect on la-
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bor force participation for women. The income e¤ect has negative e¤ect on the
probability of supplying labor, although the e¤ect is relatively small in magni-
tude and signicant only for men. The e¤ect of children is negative across both
genders and more negatively pronounced for women, while the e¤ect deteroio-
rates with the childrens ages. The probability that the labor force participation
will increase after marriage is greater for men with low level of wages than those
with high level of wages. Over the whole wage distribution, the probability of
supplying labor will be greater for married than for unmarried men. The mar-
ginal change in the estimated probability of being employed does not change
for womens marital status over the whole wage distribution but again for every
wage level, the probability of being employed is higher for married than for
unmarried women.
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A Appendix
A.1 Denitions of the variables
Log Wage: Logarithmic gross hourly wage or logarithmic net e¤ective hourly
wage; calculated for known observations from the data set and predicted by the
Heckit sample selection model for non-workers whose observations were miss-
ing.
Labor force participation (indicator): Dened as a binary variable that
takes value one for people over the minimum school-living age of 16, who were
working37 or unemployed38 in the week before the week of interview person is
employed. These persons constitute the labor force. People who are neither
working nor unemployed by the International Labor Organization (ILO) mea-
sure were coded by zero.
Education: A binary variable that equals one if the terminal education age39
was at least 16 indicating that an individual nished at least high school.
Other income: Constructed as the sum of net household income (after taxa-
tion) of other household members and non-labor income of the individual. Non-
labor income of an individual is derived as the sum of rental income, income
from investments, alimony or maintainace payments,child and state benets40 .
Married: A binary variable that equals one for married individuals who are
living with their husband or wife, or married individuals who are separated
from their husband or wife. This classication applies to persons aged 16 to 59
who answer the marital history questions. Cohabiting people are categorised
according to formal marital status41 . The classication di¤ers from strict legal
marital status in accepting the respondentsopinion of whether their marriage
37The category of working persons includes individuals aged 16 and over who, in the week
before the week of interview, worked for wages, salary or other form of cash payment such
as commission or tips, for any number of hours. It covers persons absent from work in the
reference week because of holiday, sickness, strike, or temporary lay-o¤, provided they had a
job to return to with the same employer. It also includes persons attending an educational
establishment during the specied week if they were paid by their employer while attending
it, people on Government training schemes and unpaid family workers. Unfortunately, 153
unpaid family workers were excluded from estimation due to a survey mistake, where those
persons were coded as not eligible to answer the questions about their employment status.
This mistake was latter on conrmed by the O¢ ce of National Statistics upon my request.
38The General Household Survey (GHS) uses the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
denition of unemployment. This classies anyone as unemployed if he or she was out of work
and had looked for work in the four weeks before interview, or would have but for temporary
sickness or injury, and was available to start work in the two weeks after interview. For 352
individuals who were classied as unemeployed by ILO denition of unemployment, I have
coded them with zero due to the fact that they did not supply positive amount of working
hours.
39 Individuals that were still in a process of acquiring an education are coded one because
the average terminal education age in the sample was 17.
40Other income is transformed from weekly basis that is given in the GHS to annual by
multiplying the weekly other income by the total number of weeks in a year,that is 52.
41 In this dichotomy marriedgenerally includes cohabiting and non- marriedcovers those
who are single, widowed, separated or divorced and not cohabiting.
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has terminated in separation rather than applying the criterion of legal separa-
tion.
Children 0-4 Years: A binary variable determining whether any children
younger than 5 years of age are present in the household.
Children 5-15 Years: A binary variable determining whether any children
from 5 to 15 years of age are present in the household.
Age: Age of the individual.
Age2: A square of age of the individual.
Non-white: A binary variable for ethnic classication where individuals with
non-white ethnic background are coded one and zero for white ethnic back-
ground. Non-white ethnic backgrounds include: black Caribbean, black African,
other black background, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, other Asian back-
ground, Chinese, other ethnic group and people with mixed ethnic background.
Regional indicators: A binary variables that indicate the household residence
region dened by the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS)
that serve as the administrative subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes.
Region Greater London (encompassing inner and outer London) is set as the
base42 .
42The rst level NUTS regions for UK excluded for some unknown reason Northern Ireland
from the survey
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B Appendix
B.1 Predicting wages from the Heckman sample selection
model
Heckman (1979) showed a persistence of bias in estimation based on non-
randomly selected samples. Estimating the wage equation by standard OLS
regression is biased when there are unobservables in behaviour between workers
and non-workers and when the unobserved characteristic of the decision to work
is correlated to the unobservable characteristic of the wage level. One of the
situations is when an individuals are more probably to work have on average
higher wage levels.
Using Heckmans correction approach, I estimate a wage equation condition-
ing on the non-random selection into employment. A wage equation and labor
force participation equation is formulated as follows:
logGRWi = X
0
i+ei (37)
INLFi = Z
0
i+ui (38)
where GRWi is the gross hourly wage and it is observed only if INLFi = 1,
INLFi denotes a binary variable whether an individual i participate in em-
ployment. Determinants of wage and participation in the labor force for each
individual i are denoted with vectors Xi and Zi, respectively. I assume inde-
pendance of errors, ei and ui , across individuals, joint normal distribution with
means equal zero, variances 2e and 
2
u and correlation eu: The wage and em-
ployment equations are estimated by the Heckit two step estimation, although
the maximum likelihood shows more e¢ ciency. Gross hourly wage is derived
from the weekly wage by dividing it with hours worked per week. Table 8 and
table 9 presents the estimates of the wage and labor force participation equa-
tions. The Heckit two step estimates is used to predict gross hourly wages for
every individual in the sample.
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Table 8: Heckman two step selection estimation - Men
Variable Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Logarithmic Gross Hourly Wage
Age 0.054 (0.016)
Age2 -0.001 (0.000)
Education 0.219 (0.036)
Non-white -0.108 (0.048)
Region North East -0.359 (0.063)
Region North West -0.271 (0.051)
Region YorksHum -0.253 (0.052)
Region East Midl -0.229 (0.056)
Region West Midl -0.239 (0.056)
Region East Engl -0.171 (0.053)
Region South East -0.135 (0.052)
Region South West -0.295 (0.057)
Region Wales -0.329 (0.063)
Region Scotland -0.309 (0.055)
Intercept 1.350 (0.334)
Equation 2 : Selection to employment
Age 0.176 (0.016)
Age2 -0.002 (0.000)
Education 0.192 (0.076)
Non-white -0.471 (0.090)
Other income -0.003 (0.002)
Children 0-4 Years -0.150 (0.076)
Children 5-15 Years -0.076 (0.064)
Married 0.439 (0.062)
Region North East -0.190 (0.143)
Region North West 0.037 (0.121)
Region YorksHum 0.005 (0.128)
Region East Midl 0.023 (0.129)
Region West Midl -0.039 (0.124)
Region East Engl 0.153 (0.123)
Region South East 0.197y (0.108)
Region South West 0.103 (0.134)
Region Wales -0.139 (0.150)
Region Scotland -0.136 (0.124)
Intercept -1.953 (0.311)
Equation 3 : Mills lambda
Lambda -0.721 (0.215)
N 4,392
2(14) 223.647
Bootstrap standard errors, 500 replications
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
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Table 9: Heckman two step selection estimation - Women
Variable Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 :Logarithm of Gross Hourly Wage
Age 0.051 (0.007)
Age2 -0.001 (0.000)
Education 0.316 (0.033)
Non-white -0.056 (0.041)
Region North East -0.396 (0.058)
Region North West -0.289 (0.043)
Region YorksHum -0.262 (0.045)
Region East Midl -0.292 (0.050)
Region West Midl -0.274 (0.052)
Region East Engl -0.222 (0.043)
Region South East -0.203 (0.045)
Region South West -0.336 (0.043)
Region Wales -0.394 (0.060)
Region Scotland -0.284 (0.046)
Intercept 1.171 (0.151)
Equation 2 : Selection to employment
Age 0.193 (0.013)
Age2 -0.003 (0.000)
Education 0.344 (0.057)
Non-white -0.554 (0.070)
Other income -0.001 (0.001)
Children 0-4 Years -0.947 (0.049)
Children 5-15 Years -0.584 (0.046)
Married 0.014 (0.044)
Region North East -0.009 (0.114)
Region North West 0.120 (0.084)
Region YorksHum 0.151 (0.096)
Region East Midl 0.150y (0.091)
Region West Midl -0.102 (0.088)
Region East Engl 0.020 (0.091)
Region South East 0.045 (0.080)
Region South West -0.019 (0.088)
Region Wales 0.088 (0.114)
Region Scotland -0.014 (0.091)
Intercept -2.382 (0.250)
Equation 3 : Mills lambda
Lambda -0.144 (0.059)
N 5,400
2(14) 286.393
Bootstrap standard errors, 500 replications
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
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Table 10: Summary statistics of predicted Log Gross Wage - Men
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Log Grs Wage - Observed 2.444 0.675 -4.685 7.445
Log Grs Wage - Heckit pr. 2.444 0.242 1.312 2.901
Log Grs Wage - Linear pr. 2.583 0.189 1.83 2.974
Number of observations 3,909
Table 11: Summary statistics of predicted Log Gross Wage - Women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Log Grs Wage - Observed 2.178 0.642 -5.155 5.561
Log Grs Wage - Heckit pr. 2.178 0.187 1.405 2.589
Log Grs Wage - Linear pr 2.233 0.174 1.563 2.61
Number of observations 3,981
Table 12: Summary statistics of predicted Gross Wage - Men
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Grs Wage Linear pr. 13.713 32.922 0 1710.526
Grs Wage Heckit pr. 13.779 3.929 1.095 22.979
Grs Wage Heckit cond. pr. 15.247 3.509 3.274 23.772
Number of observations 4,392
Table 13: Summary statistics of predicted Gross Wage - Women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Grs Wage Linear pr. 8.045 10.827 0 260
Grs Wage Heckit pr. 8.028 2.748 0.165 15.072
Grs Wage Heckit cond. pr. 10.66 2.042 4.527 16.144
Number of observations 5,400
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B.2 Predicting the participation form the Probit model
This subsection contains the set of estimates for the labor force participation
decision of men and women for each wage specication.
Table 14: Probit Estimation - Gross Wages, Men
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Err.
Log Wage 0.57989y 0.30400
Age 0.14411 0.02343
Age2 -0.00203 0.00026
Education 0.06076 0.10546
Non-white -0.45379 0.08907
Other income -0.00341 0.00151
Children 0-4 Years -0.15464y 0.08009
Children 5-15 Years -0.08214 0.06489
Married 0.44522 0.06608
Intercept -2.56087 0.43625
N 4,392
Log-likelihood -1383.68523
2(9) 273.9185
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
Bootstrap errors, 1000 replications
Table 15: Probit Estimation - Gross Wage, Women
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Err.
Log Wage -0.09258 0.20439
Age 0.19835 0.01758
Age2 -0.00265 0.00021
Education 0.36287 0.09024
Non-white -0.56708 0.06653
Other income -0.00091 0.00080
Children 0-4 Years -0.94520 0.04916
Children 5-15 Years -0.58506 0.04684
Married 0.01109 0.04655
Intercept -2.25100 0.28488
N 5,400
Log-likelihood -2707.2384
2(9) 763.93412
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
Bootstrap errors 1000 replications
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Table 16: Probit Estimation - Net Wages, Men
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Err.
Log Wage 0.63591y 0.32649
Age 0.14151 0.02356
Age2 -0.00199 0.00027
Education 0.05347 0.10646
Non-white -0.46489 0.09135
Other income -0.00340 0.00147
Children 0-4 Years -0.15460y 0.08365
Children 5-15 Years -0.08232 0.06672
Married 0.44557 0.06441
Intercept -2.43794 0.39412
N 4,392
Log-likelihood -1383.67713
2(9) 262.95763
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
Bootstrap errors 1000 replications
Table 17: Probit Estimation - Net Wages, Women
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Err.
Log Wage -0.04948 0.24577
Age 0.19596 0.01824
Age2 -0.00262 0.00022
Education 0.34609 0.08778
Non-white -0.57174 0.06488
Other income -0.00092 0.00085
Children 0-4 Years -0.94547 0.05219
Children 5-15 -0.58536 0.04390
Married 0.01151 0.04567
Intercept -2.29606 0.28691
N 5,400
Log-likelihood -2707.32277
2(9) 760.76464
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
Bootstrap errors 1000 replications
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